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CASE NOTES
CONTRACTS-REAL ESTATE BROKER ALLOWED TO RE-
COVER ON EXCLUSIVE "RIGHT TO SELL" CONTRACT
WHERE OWNER SOLD PROPERTY HIMSELF
Defendant, an owner of real property, engaged plaintiff, a real estate
broker, to find a purchaser for his property under a listing contract
which provided: "In consideration of your listing for sale, and your
services in undertaking to find a purchaser for the following described
real estate..., I hereby grant and give you the exclusive right to se 11....
In the event you find a purchaser for, or that said real estate is sold by or
through you or otherwise ... then in consideration of your services ten-
dered I hereby agree to pay you five percent (5%) of the selling price."1
The owner sold the property himself and the trial court refused commis-
sion to the broker. The Indiana Appellate Court at first affirmed. How-
ever, the affirming opinion was later withdrawn and the trial court re-
versed. The basis of the withdrawal and reversal was that the clause to the
effect that the commission was to be paid if the property was sold by the
broker or otherwise was controlling and supported by sufficient consider-
ation. Brown v. Maris, 150 N.E.2d 760 (Ind., 1958).
Where there is no exclusive right to sell contract, but merely an author-
ity in the broker to find a purchaser, it is generally held that the broker
may not recover any commission if the owner sells the property himself. 2
Even where the broker is given an exclusive agency contract the owner
may still sell the property himself and deny the broker his commission.3
In fact, the owner need not revoke the agency before negotiating the sale
himself. 4 This result is based upon the proposition that an exclusive agency
contract deprives the owner only of the right to appoint other agents, but
does not interfere with his right to sell the property himself. 5 Such right
of the owner to sell the property himself has been said to be an implied
condition in every contract of agency, unless expressly negatived.6
'Emphasis supplied.
2 Haggart v. King, 107 Kan. 75, 190 Pac. 763 (1920); Kimball v. Hayes, 199 Mass. 516,
86 N.E. 875 (1908); Burch v. Hester, 109 S.W. 399 (Tex., 1908); Stewart v. Murray, 92
Ind. 543 (1884); Dolan v. Scanlon, 57 Cal. 261 (1881).
3 Harris v. Stone, 137 Ark. 23, 207 S.W. 443 (1918); Davis v. Van Tassel, 107 N.Y.
Supp. 910 (1907).
4 Dreyfus v. Richardson, 20 Cal. App. 800, 130 Pac. 161 (1912).
5 Gilbert v. McCollough, 146 Iowa 333, 125 N.W. 173 (1910).
6 Ingold v. Stevens, 125 Iowa 82, 99 N.W. 713 (1904).
CASE NOTES
Where the broker has an exclusive right to sell contract with the owner,
as in the instant case, and not merely an exclusive agency, the courts have
taken several distinct views with respect to the broker's right to a com-
mission where the owner sells the property himself. Some jurisdictions
admit a difference between the two types of contracts but nevertheless
deny a commission.7 Other courts have refused to admit a distinction be-
tween exclusive agency and exclusive right to sell contracts.8 Many courts
allow a commission automatically upon sale by the owner where the
broker had an exclusive right to sell contract.9 The courts appear to be in
general agreement that where the parties specifically provide in the con-
tract that the owner will be bound to pay the broker's commission regard-
less of who sells the property the owner is bound according to these
terms.'0
The instant case and the cases on point seem to pivot on whether or not
there was included in the agreement a provision adequate to manifest an
intention that the parties intended the broker to receive a commission de-
spite sale by the owner himself. The phrase "by or through you or other-
wise" in the Brown case was deemed sufficient evidence of such intention.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Turner v. Baker stressed the
principle that parties may make any legal contract they choose which will
be binding upon them, when it said:
If the owner of real estate chooses to make a contract with a broker, in
which it is stipulated that the broker shall have the exclusive right to sell the
property within a specified time, and that he shall be entitled to receive a cer-
tain commission if a sale be made within the time designated, no matter who
makes it, he is bound by its terms, and cannot be relieved from a bad bargain
because his agreement may have been foolish or improvident."
The Iowa Supreme Court seems to require stronger, more definite lan-
guage to expressly negative the right of the owner to sell the property
without liability for the broker's commission. It has said:
The right of an owner to sell his own property is an incident of the right of
property and arises by implication in every contract of agency for sale unless
the clear and unequivocal language of the contract negatives such right. 12
7 So. Florida Farms v. Stevenson, 84 Fla. 235, 93 So. 247 (1922); Turner v. Baker,
229 Pa. 359, 74 Ad. 172 (1909).
8 Sunnyside Land & Investment Co. v. Bernier, 119 Wash. 386, 205 Pac. 1041 (1922);
McPike v. Silves, 168 Iowa 149, 150 N.W. 52 (1914).
9 Rosin v. Eksterowicz, 45 Del. 314, 73 A.2d 648 (1950); James v. Hollander, 3 N.J.
Misc. 973, 130 Ad. 451 (1925); Harris v. McPherson, 97 Conn. 164, 115 At. 723 (1922).
10 Rosin v. Eskterowicz, 45 Del. 314, 73 A.2d 648 (1950); Turner v. Baker, 225 Pa.
359, 74 Ad. 172 (1904).
I Turner v. Baker, 225 Pa. 359, 362, 74 Ad. 172, 173 (1904).
12 Hedges Co. v. Shanahan, 195 Iowa 1302, 1304, 190 NW. 957, 958 (1922).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The Virginia court in Morris v. Bragg'3 held that the broker could col-
lect a commission where the owner promised to pay the commission if the
property was sold by the broker or any other, where the owner sold the
property himself. On the other hand, the Illinois court in Wozniak v.
Siegle,14 in an exclusive agency contract, held that substantially similar
language was inadequate to give the broker a right to a commission.
In summary, it can be said that, while some courts automatically allow
the broker a commission under an exclusive right to sell contract where
the owner effects the sale himself, many courts require strong, positive
language indicating such an intention. The language of the provision in
the Brown case was sufficient to manifest this intention.
1' 155 Va. 912, 156 S.E. 381 (1931).
14 226 Ill. App. 619 (1922).
CRIMINAL LAW-MULTIPLE TRIALS FOR A SINGLE
TRANSACTION INVOLVING SEVERAL OFFENSES
HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
In several recent United States Supreme Court decisions, the issue was
raised as to whether an accused's right to due process as guaranteed under
the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where he is subjected to multiple
trials for a single transaction involving several different offenses. In Hoag
v. State of New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), three armed men entered a
tavern, lined up five persons against a wall and robbed each of them. Hoag
was arrested and indicted for the robbery of three of the victims. At the
trial only one of the victims was able to identify Hoag as one of the rob-
bers. Although several of the other victims had previously identified Hoag
from a photograph, they could not identify him at the trial. Hoag's de-
fense was that he was not present within the state at the time the robbery
took place. He was acquitted, but shortly thereafter was indicted and tried
for the robbery of another of the victims and was convicted. The Court
ruled that the State's decision to try the defendant a second time was not
so unreasonable or oppressive as to deprive him of due process of law.
In Ciucci v. State of Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958), the defendant was
charged in four separate indictments with murdering his wife and three
children, all of whom, with bullet wounds in their heads, were found dead
in a burning building. In three successive trials, Ciucci was found guilty
of the first degree murder of his wife and two of his children. The horrid
details of the four deaths were introduced into evidence at each trial. In
the first and second trials, the punishment was fixed at 20 and 45 years im-
prisonment respectively. At the third trial, involving the death of another
child, the penalty was fixed at death. The Court here held that the State
